JJXi  (r 

(UyVj  . *2v 

Reprinted  from  The  Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social 
Science,  Philadelphia,  July,  1919. 

Publication  No.  1300. 


Russia — Present  and  Future 

By  R.  M.  Story,  Ph.D.1 

International  Committee  of  Young  Mens’  Christian  Associations. 

13  USSIA  is  reaping  the  whirlwind.  For  generations  her 
* ^ autocrats  and  bureaucrats,  her  priests  and  teachers,  her 
'professional  men  and  merchant  princes  have  sowed  the  wind. 
Clothed  with  responsibilities,  endowed  with  power,  and  faced  with 
opportunities  such  as  rarely  fall  to  the  lot  of  any  leaders,  they 
stupidly  chose  to  dig  a pit  of  selfishness.  Blinded  with  their  own 
conceits  they  overreached  themselves,  and  plunged  down  headlong 
dragging  their  people  with  them.  In  all  the  hellish  misery  of  the 
present  hour  in  Russia,  one  hears  from  their  lips  no  word  of  con- 
trition and  no  plea  for  forgiveness.  The  Almighty  may  have 
mercy  upon  them,  but  in  Russia  they  are  already  numbered 
among  the  damned. 

CZARISM  AND  BOLSHEVISM 

Bolshevism  is  the  whirlwind;  it  is  the  offspring  of  czarism,  but 
not  more  hideous  either  in  principle  or  in  method.  Conceived  in 
utter  selfishness  and  in  basest  materialism  it  carries  within  its 
own  bosom  the  seeds  of  its  destruction.  Like  the  parent  tyranny 
from  which  it  sprang,  it  is  without  conscience  and  without  a god. 
“We  are  frankly  anti-Christian,”  announced  the  head  of  the 
Bolshevik  Bureau  of  Social  Welfare  to  a representative  of  the 
Y.  M.  C.  A.;  to  which  the  faith  of  a Christian  replies,  “Then  you 
will  fail.” 

Czarism  has  passed  away;  it  was  not  truly  Russian  either  in  its 
spirit  or  in  its  working.  It  was  founded  on  the  sand;  under  the 
storm  and  flood  of  war  it  fell,  and  great  has  been  the  fall  of  it. 
Bolshevism,  its  child,  also  builds  on  the  sands  of  class-rule,  hatred, 
strife,  jealousy  and  selfishness.  It  mocks  international  obliga- 
tions and  revels  in  intrigue.  With  audacious  impertinence  it 
seeks  to  override  existing  democracies  and  voices  its  claim  to 

1 The  author  is  a member  of  the  faculty  of  the  University  of  Illinois,  Depart- 
ment of  Political  Science,  on  leave  of  absence  for  work  in  Russia  under  the 
auspices  of  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.  1917-18. 


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world  dominion.  One  cannot  imagine  the  consummation  of  its 
program,  even  in  Russia.  Any  social  structure  which  is  to 
endure  in  Russia,  must  be  founded  upon  the  enduring  rock  of  good 
in  the  character  and  the  past  experience  of  the  Russian  people. 

The  Russian  Character 

One  who  has  been  through  the  agony  of  the  past  two  years 
with  Russians  can  realize  how  deep  are  the  strata  of  love,  for- 
giveness, patience  and  meekness;  how  universal  the  common 
sense  and  humor;  how  strong  the  mental  fibre;  how  glowing  the 
desire  for  knowledge;  how  wonderful  the  already  developed 
capacity  for  cooperative  effort;  how  rich  the  simple  culture;  how 
reverent  and  noble  and  genuine  the  religious  life  of  this  great 
people.  No  lust  of  conquest  or  imperial  ambitions  motivate 
them.  The  average  Russian  believes  in  the  golden  rule  as  a prac- 
tical proposition.  His  fine  idealism  and  rugged  good  sense  will 
ultimately  turn  to  confusion  the  counsel  both  of  hypocritical 
bourgeoisie  and  demagogic  bolshevist.  It  is  in  the  faith  that 
neither  of  these  pretenders  to  authoritative  speech  voices  the  real 
mind  and  will  of  Russia,  that  one  can  view  her  present  plight 
without  despair  or  even  trepidation,  and  look  to  her  future  with 
confidence  and  assurance. 

One  is  not  unmindful  of  the  present  woes  and  horrors  which 
have  overtaken  this  long-suffering  people.  Would  that  it  were 
possible  to  blot  from  memory  some  of  the  unutterable  infamies 
which  have  been  perpetrated  by  both  sides  in  this  terrible  civil 
war ! Only  too  well  known  are  the  embittered  ruthlessness  and 
calculated  terrors  of  the  bolshevist  program,  both  in  its  conception 
and  in  its  execution.  These  men  had  good  teachers.  On  the 
other  hand  are  the  arrogant,  swaggering,  imperialistic  militarists, 
the  record  of  whose  deeds  will  make  even  the  Prussian  jealous 
when  the  scalpel  of  history  bares  it  to  the  world.  And  what  shall 
one  say  of  those  who  follow  in  their  wake,  the  soulless,  vulturous 
creatures,  who  from  their  emigre  havens  outside  of  Russia  have 
been  calling  upon  the  world  to  rescue  their  prey  for  them ! Neither 
side  in  the  Russian  civil  war  has  a monopoly  of  coup  d’etats, 
Chinese  mercenaries  and  Machiavellian  principles  and  methods. 
The  great  majority  of  the  Russian  people  quite  wisely  prefer  to 
endure  stoically  the  pains  of  the  present  rather  than  cast  in  their 


Russia — Present  and  Future 


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lot  with  either  of  the  principal  groups  aspiring  for  power,  for 
neither  group  knows  what  it  is  to  respect  public  opinion,  to  have 
regard  for  ordered  liberty,  to  love  international  morality,  or  to 
recognize  the  principles  and  practices  of  democracy.  It  is  quite 
easy,  entertaining  and  popular  to  paint  the  lurid  and  the  out- 
rageous. One  may  indulge  in  this  pastime  exclusively,  may  remain 
wholly  faithful  to  the  facts  in  every  instance  related,  and  with 
the  mass  of  accumulated  evidence  may  continue  such  portrayal 
almost  indefinitely.  Yet  such  a portrayal  would  not  truly  repre- 
sent normal  conditions  in  Russia  today.  As  in  the  case  of  Uncle 
Tom’s  Cabin , granted  that  every  detail  related  could  be  sub- 
stantiated, yet  the  aggregate  impression  conveyed  is  wrong. 
The  dislocation  in  life,  industry  and  transport  is  severe.  The 
sufferings  endured  are  often  intense,  but  there  is  no  such  unin- 
terrupted carnival  of  blood  and  crime,  no  such  wallow  of  corrup- 
tion, as  the  more  picturesque  reports  would  have  one  believe. 
There  is  less  of  disorder  and  suffering  in  bolshevik  Russia,  and  less 
of  stability  in  non-bolshevik  Russia,  than  is  generally  indicated. 
Allowing  for  the  effects  of  the  war,  the  masses  of  the  Russian 
people  know  little  more  of  oppression  today  than  they  have  known 
in  generations  past.  Large  sections  of  the  country  are  com- 
paratively quiet.  The  impairment  of  former  conditions  of  life 
has  not  come  quickly.  The  disruption  of  normal  life  began  in 
1914,  and  affairs  have  grown  progressively  worse  from  then  till 
now.  Individual  and  social  adjustments  have  to  some  extent 
kept  pace  with  misfortune  and  there  has  been  no  sudden  or  over- 
whelming collapse.  The  nearest  approach  to  it  followed  the 
demobilization  of  the  army.  The  only  explanations  for  Russia’s 
survival  of  that  supreme  test  are  found  in  prohibition,  the  aver- 
age man’s  good  sense,  the  faithfulness  of  the  railway  employes, 
and  the  wide  distribution  of  the  shock. 

The  Effect  of  the  European  War 

I entered  Russia  before  the  bolshevik  revolution.  The  country 
had  been  three  years  at  war.  It  had  already  been  gutted  as  by 
fire.  Vast  areas  had  been  swept  over  by  the  contending  forces. 
Man-power,  industry,  financial  stability  and  transport  had  been 
sacrificed  to  the  terrible  demands  of  the  struggle  with  Germany. 
Twenty  million  men  had  been  mobilized  for  the  armies,  and  the 


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armies  had  suffered  nine  million  casualties  including  prisoners. 
Agriculture,  the  principal  industry,  had  suffered  no  less  than 
manufacture.  Roubles  were  selling  for  five  cents  in  Vladivostok, 
and  you  can  buy  them  no  cheaper  today.  Bank  credits  were 
grossly  over  extended  through  war  loans  and  speculative  activities. 
The  vice-president  of  the  Zemsky  Soiuz  informed  me  in  Novem- 
ber, 1917,  that  the  productive  capacity  of  his  organization — a fair 
example — in  the  Moscow  district  had  fallen  from  40  to  60  per 
cent  during  the  preceding  year.  Trains  were  running  from  three 
days  to  a week  late  on  the  Trans-Siberian.  The  morale  of  the 
army  was  gone,  and  many  competent  observers,  British,  French, 
Belgian,  and  Czech  soldiers,  who  had  been  fighting  with  the 
army,  testify  that  there  was  little  chance  for  the  restoration 
of  that  morale  after  the  disasters  in  the  fall  of  1916. 

Russia  was  already  prostrate  when  swept  by  the  revolution. 
She  was  prostrate  not  only  because  of  the  corrupt  and  incapable 
leadership  to  which  her  destinies  had  been  committed;  not  only 
because  of  her  military  defeats  and  economic  insufficiency;  but 
prostrate  because  her  masses  in  their  ignorance  did  not  compre- 
hend the  significance  of  the  conflict.  If  Russia  was  already 
prostrate  in  1917,  what  has  transpired  since  then  may  be  viewed 
in  the  nature  of  a misdirected  protest;  a protest  which  aggravates 
rather  than  betters  the  misfortunes  against  which  it  is  directed, 
but  which  can  be  greatly  overestimated  in  its  importance. 

The  person  who  fastens  his  attention  upon  the  disasters  of  the 
war,  or  gives  way  to  undue  concern  regarding  bolshevism  or 
attaches  his  hopes  to  the  success  of  the  Siberian,  North  Russian 
and  other  ostensible  champions  of  constitutional  government, 
will  certainly  fail  in  any  just  approximation  of  the  future  of 
Russia.  These  may  all  affect,  but  they  will  not  determine,  that 
future.  There  is  so  much  bolshevism  in  anti-bolshevik  Russia 
and  so  much  anti -bolshevism  in  bolshevik  Russia  that  the  fate  of 
the  momentous  issues  at  stake  in  Russia  cannot  possibly  be  de- 
cided by  mere  changes  in  battle  lines  or  even  by  the  rise  and  fall 
of  temporary  antagonists  for  power.  The  situation  is  far  more 
baffling  in  its  complexities;  far  more  astounding  in  its  contradic- 
tions; and  far  less  susceptible  of  analysis  or  even  intelligent 
observation  than  the  majority  of  foreigners,  who  have  been  there, 
like  to  admit.  The  wise  student  of  Russia’s  future  will  rather 


Russia — Present  and  Future 


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* seek  to  ascertain  and  study  the  great  underlying  currents  of  Rus- 
sian life  and  thought.  He  will  seek  out  the  fundamental  and 
substantial  elements  of  former  social  organization  and  practice 
and  the  individual  virtues  that  are  universally  recognized  as  sig- 
nificant in  the  lives  and  destinies  of  peoples  who  seek  to  be  free. 

The  Future 

The  fundamental  present  facts  which  in  my  opinion  have  per- 
manent bearing  on  Russia’s  future  are: 

1.  Russia  is  rich  in  her  natural  resources,  so  wondrously  rich 
that  the  average  American  literally  has  no  conception  of  the 
tremendous  possibilities  of  the  great  Slavic  domain.  Natural 
resources  of  this  character  are  vital.  Upon  them  national  life 
may  draw  for  its  recuperation,  if  the  will  and  the  determination  to 
recover  are  present.  It  is,  therefore,  to  the  characteristics  of  the 
Russian  people  and  to  their  social  institutions  that  one  must 
address  himself  if  he  is  to  know  whether  Russia  will  recover. 

2.  The  true  Russian  spirit  is  tolerant,  democratic,  spon- 
* taneous  and  unspoiled,  if  one  may  judge  by  the  soldiers  and  the 

peasants.  Wanting  much  in  self-discipline  and  the  spirit  of  com- 
promise yet  they  knew  not  arrogance  nor  false  pride,  nor  was 
there  in  them  any  servility;  they  were  free  men.  One  of  them  in 
the  rapture  of  his  freedom  expressed  it  thus,  “I  have  known 
what  it  is  to  be  free.  To  have  had  one  day  of  the  revolution  is 
better  than  all  my  previous  existence.” 

3.  The  Russian  temper  is  radical  in  its  attitude  toward  political, 
social  and  economic  problems.  It  is  definitely  intended  that  the 
old  order  shall  not  continue  in  the  new  nation  which  the  people 
aspire  to  build.  For  example,  in  all  of  my  travels  in  Russia,  I did 
not  meet  with  a single  Russian  who  wished  to  see  American  social 
and  economic  civilization  reproduced  in  his  country.  It  is  upon 
the  vision  of  a better  social  order  that  the  bolshevist  regime  has 
built  up  its  power,  but  no  one  who  knows  the  radicalism  of  the 
average  Russian  can  for  a moment  believe  that  his  conception  of 
the  better  social  order  will  permanently  admit  of  the  substitution 

# of  a new  tyranny  in  place  of  the  old. 

Moreover,  if  Russia  appears  radical  from  our  point  of  view, 
we  should  bear  in  mind  that  she  may  not  be  so  radical  from  her 
f own  standpoint.  Private  property  has  never  enjoyed  the  recog- 


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nition  in  Russia  which  it  has  in  America  and  in  western  Europe. 
If  in  the  working  out  of  their  social  vision,  the  Russian  people 
choose  to  modify  still  further  the  recognition  which  it  has  hereto- 
fore had,  it  will  be  but  the  confirmation  of  a tendency  long  since 
established. 

4.  Russia  is  rich  in  social  experience  as  well  as  in  natural  re- 
sources, democratic  in  spirit  and  radical  in  temper.  In  his  bitter 
struggle  for  a better  world,  the  peasant  has  learned  the  value  of 
cooperative  enterprise.  The  cooperative  buying,  selling  and 
banking  organizations  of  Russia  and  Siberia  are  among  the 
great  institutions  developed  in  former  years.  Except  in  a very 
limited  sense,  these  great  cooperatives  have  restricted  themselves 
to  buying  and  selling  and  banking,  but  it  will  be  surprising  indeed 
if  the  economic  rehabilitation  of  Russia  in  manufacturing  and 
mining  does  not  come  about  through  the  application  of  the  coop- 
erative principles  already  well  established.  I see  no  other  method 
of  economic  readjustment  that  is  in  keeping  with  the  social  views 
of  the  masses  and  the  practical  problems  involved. 

5.  The  Russian  people  are  poor  in  education.  Yet  I have  never 
been  any  other  place  where  the  intellectual  hunger  is  as  keen  and 
insatiable  as  it  is  in  Russia.  To  think  that  this  desire  for  knowl- 
edge has  been  the  object  of  much  of  the  repression  and  oppression 
which  the  Russian  people  have  undergone!  One  of  the  great  and 
crying  needs  of  Russia  today,  one  which  all  substantial  elements 
of  the  population  seem  unanimous  in  their  desire  to  realize,  is 
education.  Sad  as  it  is  to  witness  the  levelling  down  of  the  insti- 
tutions of  higher  learning  in  Russia,  it  is  but  a part  of  the  retribu- 
tion which  has  swept  in  upon  the  privileged  classes.  The  Uni- 
versities of  Moscow  and  Petrograd  and  similar  institutions  may 
have  been  demoted  from  their  high  calling,  but  they  are  being 
definitely  related  to  the  most  immediate  and  pressing  educational 
needs  of  the  Russian  people. 

6.  Russia  has  genuine  unity,  cultural,  political,  economic,  and 
religious.  After  admitting  the  present  potency  of  the  separatist 
and  disruptive  forces  which  are  at  work,  one  must  still  face  the 
great  underlying  unity  of  culture.  A common  medium  of  speech 
and  a universal  body  of  literature,  song,  art  and  custom  continue. 
These  create  a desire  for  political  unity.  Many  Lithuanians, 
Ukrainians,  Siberians  and  even  Poles  have  privately  recognized 


Russia — Present  and  Future 


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the  ultimate  necessity  of  a federal  union  of  the  component  parts 
of  what  was  formerly  the  Russian  empire.  A separatist  move- 
ment in  Siberia  in  1918  received  no  substantial  support.  The 
economic  interests  of  the  various  sections  of  the  old  empire  are 
already  knit  together  in  a fashion  so  plain  and  substantial  that 
the  separatist  tendencies  which  are  present  have  before  them  an 
exceedingly  difficult  struggle  if  they  are  to  prevail.  The  cultural, 
political  and  economic  unity  is  reinforced  by  a spiritual  unity 
which  obtains  throughout  Great  Russia,  Ukraine  and  Siberia, 
and  which  has  planted  its  roots  deeply  in  the  furthermost  corners 
of  the  old  empire.  It  is  a force — manifested  chiefly  in  the  Ortho- 
dox church — which  is  under  a cloud  today,  but  which  is  potent 
^ in  its  capacity  for  future  influence  upon  the  destinies  of  Russia. 
Finally  there  is  geographical  unity.  As  I travelled  over  Russia 
and  Siberia,  I was  frequently  reminded  of  the  Honorable  James 
Bryce’s  dictum  in  regard  to  our  own  Mississippi  Valley — it  was 
meant  to  be  the  home  of  one  people.  The  geographical  unity  has 
been  emphasized  by  a remarkable  system  of  river,  railway  and 
* canal  transportation,  which  strengthens  at  every  point  the  other 
elements  of  unity.  I cannot  believe  that  the  forces  of  unity  and 
integration  have  been  more  than  temporarily  suspended  by  the 
1 conditions  which  now  obtain. 

7.  In  its  governmental  institutions,  one  jnust  bear  in  mind 
that  Russia  has  had  a minimum  of  political  experience  with 
democracy;  that  it  is  without  trusted  political  leaders,  without 
tried  and  proven  popular  institutions  of  government  and  without 
the  stabilizing  influence  of  political  traditions. 

It  is  not  altogether  clear  to  me  that  the  village  mir  or  the 
Zemstvos  or  the  Duma,  either  municipal  or  national,  are  to  endure. 
It  is  very  doubtful  if  they  command  popular  confidence  and  sup- 
port. My  own  impressions  are  that  they  do  not  now  do  so.  The 
soviet,  on  the  other  hand,  has  gathered  around  it  the  loyalty  and 
enthusiasm  of  the  revolutionary  movement,  and  has  the  honor 
of  having  saved  the  social  and  economic  character  of  the  revolu- 
tionary movement.  It  has  innumerable  defects.  But  its  con- 
* stitution  is  still  in  the  formative  state  and  is  undergoing  rapid 

modifications.  The  great  importance  of  the  soviet  lies  in  the 
fact  that  it  is  the  only  political  institution  in  which  the  Russian 
people  seem  to  have  confidence.*  The  average  Russian  peasant. 


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or  the  workingman,  has  little  trust  or  interest  even  in  a Con- 
stituent Assembly;  he  will  tell  you  his  fear  that  though  he  were 
in  a majority  he  could  not  control  it  because  of  his  political  inex- 
perience. In  the  soviet,  on  the  other  hand,  he  believes  he  can 
ultimately  make  his  point  and  maintain  it.  He  will  admit  that  it 
may  be  perverted  and  often  has  been,  but  will  deny  that  such 
perversion  can  be  long  or  continuously  maintained.  In  this 
confidence  which  the  masses  of  the  population  have  in  the  soviet 
and  in  its  own  capacity  for  rapid  change  and  development  lie  the 
possibilities  of  its  future.  My  impression  is  that  it  must  be 
reckoned  with  in  any  consideration  of  the  future  of  Russia. 

In  conclusion,  let  me  suggest  a few  of  the  things  which  it  seems 
to  me  we  may  confidently  expect  to  come  out  of  Russia’s  present 
struggle. 

1.  The  rehabilitation  of  the  Russian  state  on  some  federative 
basis,  which  will  include  the  Balkan  provinces,  the  Ukraine, 
the  Caucasus,  and  Siberia,  but  will  almost  certainly  exclude 
Poland  and  Finland. 

2.  The  application  of  state  ownership  and  control  to  transpor- 
tation, education,  certain  banking  and  financial  functions,  and 
welfare  work. 

3.  A cooperative  rural  and  industrial  economy,  based  upon 
past  experiences  and  prevailing  ideals. 

4.  Considerable  latitude  for  private  initiative  and  corporate 
activity.  The  field  for  such  developments,  however,  will  be 
limited  as  compared  with  what  today  exists  in  the  United  States. 

5.  The  definite  abandonment  of  militaristic  and  imperialistic 
programs  of  the  past  and  of  the  wild  radicalism  of  the  present;  a 
wholehearted  committal  to  international  peace,' to  the  intensive 
development  of  the  native  character,  culture,  institutions  and 
resources. 

6.  There  are  yet  many  long  years  of  civil  war  and  strife  ahead 
of  Russia.  It  will  not  be  surprising  if  revolution  follows  revolu- 
tion, so  wide  spread  is  the  unrest,  so  inadequate  the  leadership, 
and  so  poor  are  the  facilities  for  effective  expression  of  public 
opinion.  Yet,  despite  this  unhappy  prospect,  one  who  has  been  in 
Russia  and  has  come  to  know  her  people  can  hardly  doubt  her 
future.  If  it  is  impossible  to  explain  Russia,  if  it  is  beyond  us 
even  to  understand  and  comprehend  her,  one  can  yet  have  faith  in 


Russia — Present  and  Future 


9 


her.  And  it  is  a remarkable  fact  that  those  of  my  associates  who 
have  known  Russia  longest  trust  her  most. 

For  Americans  who  have  such  faith,  there  is  open  the  privilege 
of  an  unselfish  and  sympathetic  assistance  to  a people  who  need 
help  and  who  welcome  and  appreciate  it  when  rendered.  There 
can  be  no  sure  method  of  helping  Russia  that  is  not  founded  on 
the  law  of  love  and  mutual  respect.  The  soul  of  the  new  Russia 
will  spurn  any  other. 


\ 


} 


Reprinted  from  The  American  Political  Science  Review,  Vol.  XIII,  No.  3,  August,  1919 


FOREIGN  GOVERNMENTS  AND  POLITICS 

EDITED  BY  FREDERIC  A.  OGG 
University  of  Wisconsin 

Observations  on  Soviet  Government.  Over  a year  and  a half  has 
passed  since  soviet  government  was  declared  in  Russia.  That  is  not 
a long  period  of  time  in  the  history  of  a great  revolutionary  movement. 
Developments  which  loom  large  during  these  years  and  which  impress 
even  thoughtful  men  and  women  may  prove  to  be  of  little  consequence 
in  the  final  determination  of  things,  while  the  still  small  voices  which 
are  often  unheard  and  usually  unheeded  by  contemporaries  swell  into 
the  chorus  of  decisive  opinion  which  settles  the  course  of  affairs.  It  is 
a matter  for  trepidation,  therefore,  when  one  ventures  to  search  mid 
the  political  and  institutional  debris  for  the  foundation  stones  upon 
which  a new  democracy  is  to  rest,  or  to  attempt  to  appraise  the  undried, 
rough-hewn  timbers  hastily  thrown  into  the  erection  of  a temporary 
political  superstructure.  Only  the  hope  that  the  tentative  observations 
of  one  who  was  there  may  assist  others  to  interpret  this  titanic  move- 
ment justifies  the  present  note. 

There  were  soviets  in  Russia  before  the  Bolshevik  uprising  in  No- 
vember, 1917.  Similar  organizations  had  appeared  during  the  course  of 
the  1905  revolution.  At  first  they  took  form  in  the  ranks  of  organized 
labor.  The  laboring  masses  of  Russia  constituted  the  most  fertile  soil 
for  revolutionary  and  socialistic  propaganda.  The  laborer  was  usually 
of  peasant  origin.  He  had  come  to  the  city  in  search  of  better  things. 
Perhaps  he  had  been  driven  from  the  village  by  the  increase  of  popula- 
tion or  by  the  inequitable  distribution  of  land.  The  conditions  of  in- 
dustrial toil  and  life  were  so  bad  that  exploitation  such  as  no  other  white 
men  now  know  was  the  common  lot.  Housing  conditions  that  came 
under  personal  observation  recall  the  worst  descriptions  from  English 
and  American  industrial  history. 

To  the  industrial  workers  their  council  or  soviet  quickly  became  the 
symbol  of  their  newly  won  political  freedom  and  the  assurance  of  social 
and  economic  reconstruction.  It  was  a short  step  from  distrust  of  the 
conservative  revolutionary  forces  and  the  old  political  institutions  with 

460 


FOREIGN  GOVERNMENTS  AND  POLITICS 


461 


their  bureaucratic  machinery  to  the  cry  “All  power  to  the  soviets,” 
an  appeal  emblazoned  on  thousands  of  banners  and  voiced  by  millions 
of  toilers. 

The  councils  of  workmen,  soldiers  and  peasants  never  lost  sight  of  the 
basic  fact  that  the  revolution  was  social  and  economic.  All  of  the  social 
revolutionary  groups  came  to  regard  the  councils  or  soviets  as  the  real 
defenders  of  the  revolution.  The  establishment  of  soviets  was  there- 
fore promoted  with  feverish  haste  during  the  early  months  of  the  revolu- 
tion and  was  even  fostered  by  Kerensky  himself.  Nor  was  this  task 
particularly  difficult  except  in  its  scope.  In  many  places  the  councils 
had  long  been  hidden  in  the  recesses  created  by  the  necessity  of  evading 
the  vigilance  of  the  old  regime.  They  took  on  a new  life  and  strength 
at  the  first  evidence  of  freedom  from  old  restraints.  The  organization 
and  development  of  some  hundreds  of  soviets  is  one  of  the  amazing  feats 
of  the  first  six  months  of  the  revolution.  Between  March  and  No- 
vember, 1917,  the  institutional  basis  of  state  power  in  Russia  was  rad- 
ically altered.  Yet  the  substantial  character  of  the  soviet  as  the  source 
of  power  has  surprised  its  friends  and  confounded  its  enemies,  domestic 
and  foreign. 

In  the  early  months  of  the  revolution  many  efforts  were  made  by  learn- 
ed students  to  explain  the  essential  democracy  of  local  and  provincial 
institutions  such  as  the  village  mir  and  the  zemstvo.  Indeed  they  were 
cited  as  the  evidence  that  Russia  was  and  had  been  democratic  in  spirit 
even  under  Tsarism.  They  would  be  cornerstones  in  the  new  state  edi- 
fice and  would  bear  the  strain  of  the  transition  from  autocracy  to  democ- 
racy. How  could  tried,  worthy,  and  venerable  agencies  such  as  these 
be  ignored?  Yet  today  neither  the  village  mir  nor  the  zemstvo  offer 
hope  for  reconstruction.  They  do  not  even  give  evidence  of  life.  In 
European  Russia  the  zemstvos  have  been  liquidated  and  in  Siberia 
where  they  were  never  strong  or  indigenous,  they  have  voluntarily 
sought  to  disappear.  The  mir  has  been  supplanted  largely  by  the  soviet. 

It  may  be  too  early  to  accept  the  fate  of  the  mir  and  the  zemstvo  as 
final.  Their  present  condition  may  be  one  of  dormancy.  But  it  would 
be  folly  to  close  one’s  mind  to  the  fact  that  the  great  majority  of  Russians 
are  quite  willing  to  effect  a rather  complete  break  with  the  past. 
Although  the  zemstvo  and  the  mir  served  important  social  and  eco- 
nomic purposes  prior  to  the  revolution,  they  have  not  survived  as 
organs  for  the  important  business  now  at  hand. 

In  the  case  of  the  mir  there  are  two  views  which  seem  tenable  at  the 
present  time,  and  with  the  data  that  can  now  be  obtained  it  is  too  early 


462 


THE  AMERICAN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  REVIEW 


to  decide  between  them.  According  to  the  first  the  soviet  is  substan- 
tially an  outgrowth  of  the  mir.  It  represents  the  natural  and  logical 
expansion  of  the  mir  when  the  latter  was  called  upon  to  assume  the  larger 
governmental  functions  entailed  by  revolution  and  popular  govern- 
ment. In  favor  of  this  view  there  is  little  data,  but  it  is  difficult  other- 
wise to  explain  the  sudden  and  overwhelming  victory  of  the  soviet  in 
local  affairs. 

The  other  view  and  one  which  has  considerable  to  substantiate  it  is 
that  among  large  and  important  groups  of  the  population  there  existed 
a positive  distrust  of  the  former  agencies  of  government.  This  attitude 
was  particularly  characteristic  of  the  industrial  workers  and  the  soldiers. 
The  former  in  their  reaction  from  industrial  oppression  demanded  prole- 
tarian control  of  industry,  and  as  there  was  no  former  organ  of  govern- 
ment devised  for  this  purpose,  the  effort  was  made  to  adapt  the  soviet 
to  industrial  organization  and  administration,  an  undertaking  which 
has  thus  far  proved  beyond  its  capacity.  On  the  other  hand,  among  the 
rural  population  the  village  mir  had  been  performing  certain  communal 
functions  for  many  generations.  It  is  true,  however,  that  its  preroga- 
tives had  been  increasingly  subjected  to  official  interference  and  there 
could  be  no  confidence  that  it  would  be  able  to  meet  the  new  order. 
Moreover  the  returning  soldiers  had  become  familiar  with  the  soviet  as 
an  effective  instrument.  Most  of  the  men  who  were  demobilized  were 
peasants  and  quite  naturally  they  took  the  soviet  home  with  them. 
The  village  mir  machinery  was  found  inadequate  to  care  for  the  problem 
of  distributing  the  land,  especially  in  cases  of  dispute  between  vil- 
lagers. Intervillage  warfare  frequently  arose  and  the  adjustment  of 
rival  claims  was  beyond  the  mir.  It  was  a task  calling  for  imagination, 
courage,  accommodation  and  new  administrative  machinery.  Soviet 
authority  and  organization  were  welcome  to  the  distracted  yet  peace- 
fully disposed  peasant.  Moreover  this  authority  not  only  effected  the 
negotiations  and  made  the  adjustments  incident  to  land  distribution,  but 
also  gave  assurance  that  it  would  permanently  support  the  settlements 
effected.  To  the  land  hungry  peasant  and  his  family  the  soviet  quickly 
supplanted  the  mir  as  an  object  of  fealty  and  regard. 

As  for  the  zemstvo,  it  was  from  the  first  suspected  of  being  an  insti- 
tution that  was  bourgeois  both  in  its  conception  and  management.  It 
did  not  and  could  not  command  the  confidence  of  the  masses  because  it 
did  not  possess  that  of  its  own  employees.  It  was  early  made  the  object 
of  attack  and  its  business  operations  in  soviet  Russia  finally  liquidated. 

The  foregoing  explanations  of  the  rise  of  the  soviet  and  the  fall  of  the 


FOREIGN  GOVERNMENTS  AND  POLITICS 


463 


mir  and  the  zemstvo  may  prove  to  be  inadequate  in  the  light  of  more 
complete  information.  But  in  the  main  they  harmonize  with  the  fact 
that  the  Russian  revolution  is  primarily  a social  and  economic  move- 
ment, and  that  political  institutions  can  endure  only  if  they  give  expres- 
sion to  the  social  and  economic  forces  at  work.  Failure  to  recognize  the 
true  character  of  the  revolution  and  efforts  to  restrain  revolutionary 
developments  within  purely  political  lines  have  helped  bring  the  Allies 
to  their  present  unhappy  relations  with  Russia  and  have  contributed 
not  a little  to  the  present  misfortunes  of  her  people.  The  attentions 
of  ill-advised  and  self-seeking  friends  and  allies  may  be  altogether  as 
embarrassing  to  a people  in  disaster  and  distress  as  the  blows  of  a known 
enemy. 

From  the  first  the  soviet  caught  the  fancy  and  devotion  of  the  masses. 
In  its  simpler  forms  it  is  not  unlike  a mass  meeting  and  in  the  earlier 
days  its  procedure  was  elastic  and  membership  was  open  to  all  citizens 
within  respective  economic  groups.  Opportunity  was  offered  for  all  voices 
that  so  desired  to  be  heard,  even  though  the  time  given  was  brief — two, 
three  or  five  minutes — and  the  length  of  time  given  was  the  decision  of 
the  meeting,  not  the  ruling  of  a committee  or  officer.  Men  spoke  to 
men  who  would  understand.  The  superior  learning  and  prestige  of  the 
professional  man  or  the  stilted  oratory  of  the  politician,  or  the  awesome 
presence  of  the  man  of  affairs  did  not  intrude.  Brickmaker  spoke  to 
brickmaker,  textile  worker  to  textile  worker,  store  clerk  to  store  clerk. 
The  repressed  and  pent  up  grievances,  beliefs,  aspirations  of  tens  of 
thousands  found  expression  in  words.  In  company  with  men  who  lived 
as  they  lived,  who  knew  and  appreciated  the  common  hopes,  they  chose 
delegates  from  among  themselves  who  were  to  speak  for  them  in  the 
higher  councils  of  the  city  and  the  nation.  Moreover  the  verdict  as 
to  policy  was  never  closed.  It  was  always  open  to  readjustment  in  ac- 
cord with  new  and  subsequent  expressions  of  opinion.  Delegates  could 
be  recalled  at  will. 

From  the  very  first  the  fluid  form  of  the  soviet  constitution  proved 
one  of  the  sources  of  its  strength.  The  tremendous  momentum  attained 
by  the  revolutionary  current  as  it  swept  over  and  through  the  old  levee? 
of  custom,  destroying  the  institutional  walls  of  centuries,  tearing  apart 
the  social  structure  and  wrecking  its  machinery,  and  cutting  new  chan- 
nels through  old  barriers,  was  relieved  only  through  the  soviets.  In  them 
was  reposed  the  confidence  of  the  masses,  so  far  as  confidence  remained 
in  any  organ  of  government.  Whatever  measure  of  deliberation,  of  re- 
straint, of  direction,  characterized  public  affairs,  scanty  as  these  evidences 


464 


THE  AMERICAN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  REVIEW 


of  self-government  often  appeared  to  the  observer,  must  be  credited  to  the 
soviets.  For  without  them  Russia  would  have  been  plunged  into  the 
anarchy  of  despair.  The  new  wine  cou'd  not  be  contained  in  the  old 
bottles.  The  soviet  very  often  failed,  but  its  successes  were  not  in- 
conspicuous. 

One  view  into  the  workings  of  this  newly  found  organ  of  the  masses 
will  throw  light  upon  its  widespread  popularity.  The  room  is  one 
that  is  commodious  and  capable  of  seating  four  or  five  hundred  people. 
It  gives  evidence  of  having  seen  better  days.  Probably  it  has  been 
requisitioned  for  its  present  use.  At  one  end  is  a platform  with  a few 
.chairs  on  it.  Individual  chairs  are  massed  in  the  center,  and  there  is 
plenty  of  standing  room  at  the  sides  of  the  hall  and  at  the  rear.  The 
meeting  begins  about  seven-thirty  and  the  hall  is  well  filled  ahead  of 
time,  sometimes  crowded.  Voting  is  done  by  acclamation.  A chair- 
man is  selected,  unless  one  has  previously  been  selected  and  has  time 
yet  to  serve.  The  country  is  wanting  peace,  bread  and  land.  These 
men,  in  particular,  desire  peace  and  bread.  The  discussion  covers  many 
subjects,  but  the  peace  discussions  at  Brest-Litovsk  are  getting  a 
hearing.  Germany  is  showing  her  teeth,  and  the  vision  of  a peace 
without  annexations  and  without  indemnities  is  not  so  bright  as  it  had 
been.  Yet  the  land  must  have  peace.  Without  it  there  can  be  no 
bread.  Even  their  beloved  revolution  may  be  lost.  Many  speakers 
are  heard,  most  of  them  favoring  peace  even  on  the  harshest  terms 
laid  down  by  the  enemy.  All  of  the  speeches  are  expressions  of  opin- 
ion by  common  folk.  Eloquence  of  surpassing  quality  breaks  forth 
from  the  most  unlooked  for  sources.  One  listens  to  a rough  modjik, 
a common  soldier  who  had  been  two  years  at  the  front,  and  had  been 
decorated  for  bravery.  Hear  the  wonderful  description  with  which 
he  introduces  himself:  “I  come  from  a place  where  men  dig  their  own 
graves  and  call  them  trenches,”  and  then  followed  a burst  of  impas- 
sioned speech,  telling  of  hardship,  want,  treachery  and  slaughter.  It 
closed  with  a demand  from  the  soldiers  that  the  government  seek 
peace.  No  government  could  long  endure  which  neglected  that 
demand.  The  soviet  was  the  channel  through  which  that  demand 
was  voiced  and  made  effective. 

The  soviet  was  seriously  handicapped  because  of  failure  to  appre- 
ciate its  constitution  and  the  limitations  thereby  imposed.  Such 
appreciation  was  almost  equally  lacking  in  its  friends  and  in  its  foes. 
Legislative,  executive,  and  judicial  functions  frequently  have  been 
confused.  Relations  with  superior  soviet  authorities  have  been  in- 


FOREIGN  GOVERNMENTS  AND  POLITICS 


465 


sufficiently  defined  or  have  been  ignored.  “All  power  to  the  soviets” 
has  too  frequently  been  taken  seriously  by  local  bodies.  Small  wonder 
that  confusion  and  mistakes  and  perversions  have  occurred — with 
what  frequency  and  serious  consequences  only  the  future  historian 
can  reveal. 

Despite  these  conditions  the  soviets  have  shown  remarkable 
tenacity,  capacity  for  adjustment,  and  adaptability.  In  the  first  place, 
they  have  made  the  masses  feel  themselves  politically  effective.  The 
fact  that  this  effectiveness  has  come  about  through  a virtual  abdica- 
tion of  certain  normal  prerogatives  does  not  substantially  alter  the 
case.  The  abdication  has  the  merit  of  being  largely  voluntary.  The 
party  in  power  had  the  advantages  of  definite  objectives,  cohesive 
organization,  and  capable  and  acknowledged  leadership.  Having  cap- 
tured the  government  it  has  operated  it  without  regard  to  its  own  or 
its  opponents  theories.  The  necessity  of  carrying  out  the  party  pro- 
gram has  determined  the  means.  The  position  and  power  of  the  chief 
commissar  in  Russia  has  been  actually  as  strong  as  that  of  an  American 
president  during  war,  perhaps  stronger.  His  commands  are  effec- 
tive wherever  the  arm  of  the  soviet  extends.  The  word  of  the  Tsar 
was  never  more  authoritative.  For  the  moment  the  party  in  power 
may  even  resort  to  the  suppression  of  minorities  in  the  soviet — but 
there  is  no  reason  to  believe  such  suppression  has  been  serious  enough 
to  menace  the  existence  or  popularity  of  the  institution. 

There  is  far  more  smoke  than  fire  in  the  protests  over  the  suppres- 
sion of  the  constituent  assembly  and  the  exclusion  of  the  bourgeois  ele- 
ments from  the  soviets.  Ninety-three  per  cent  of  the  Russian  people 
have  something  at  stake  in  the  success  of  the  soviet  form  of  government. 
Under  the  old  regime  they  had  practically  nothing.  To  such  people 
the  fine  points  of  the  law,  their  own  convenience,  and  perhaps  their 
new  found  rights  are  temporarily  unimportant  if  counter-revolution 
appears  to  menace  the  one  institution  in  which  they  have  confidence 
and  which  they  believe  they  can  ultimately  control.  They  can  endure 
much.  They  are  accustomed  to  it.  And  they  are  wasting  little  time 
or  thought  over  the  misery  and  wailings  of  their  former  oppressors. 
Despite  executive  usurpation,  legislative  perversion,  and  the  sub- 
stitution of  inquisition  and  terrorism  for  judicial  procedure,  the  soviet 
has  continued  in  the  affections  of  the  masses. 

On  the  other  hand  the  weaknesses  of  soviet  government  have  been 
overshadowed  by  its  importance  as  the  defender  of  the  revolution. 
There  has  been  no  quarter  given  in  the  battle  between  socialism  and 


466 


THE  AMERICAN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  REVIEW 


capitalism.  Wanton  violations  of  soviet  principles  have  been  serious. 
In  order  to  gain  time  and  the  appearence  of  unity,  the  ruthless  sup- 
pression of  minorities  and  every  immorality  known  to  statecraft  has 
been  employed.  On  reflection  one  is  reminded,  however,  that  new 
principles  in  government  are  seldom  established  by  tea  party  methods 
unless  they  are  of  the  Boston  type.  The  radical  nature  of  the  revo- 
lutionary objectives  has  made  the  struggle  a desperate  one.  For  the 
soviet  to  be  subordinated  to  the  ends  of  the  party  in  power  is  only 
what  one  might  expect.  Constitutional  tradition  is  not  old  in  Russia. 
The  peril  of  foreign  war  and  intervention  has  not  contributed  strength 
to  the  forces  of  tolerance  and  moderation. 

It  is  important  to  distinguish  between  the  soviet  as  an  institution 
of  government  and  the  political  party  which  is  temporarily  in  power. 
In  principle  the  soviet  admits  of  more  than  one  political  party,  recog- 
nizes the  probability  of  party  struggle  for  its  organization  and  control, 
and  finds  its  own  effectiveness  and  development  chiefly  under  party 
direction.  For  the  present  the  Bolshevik  party  may  dominate  the 
soviet,  may  pervert  it  as  parties  often  do  with  political  institutions, 
and  may  even  seek  to  direct  and  determine  its  constitution  and  de- 
velopment. Nevertheless  the  soviet  is  very  far  from  being  a strictly 
Bolshevik  preserve,  and  it  is  because  it  is  difficult  of  control  that  the 
Bolsheviks  have  resorted  to  desperate  measures  to  continue  their  su- 
premacy. It  is  not  improbable  that  the  Bolshevik  party  has  greater 
reason  to  fear  its  removal  from  power  through  the  soviets  than  through 
outside  agencies.  The  soviet  offers  such  immediate,  effective  and  con- 
stant opportunity  for  party  change  that  no  party  which  lacks  a pro- 
gram, cohesive  organization,  a reasonable  degree  of  popular  support, 
and  experienced,  skilled  and  farsighted  leadership  can  hope  long  to 
control  it.  There  is  and  can  be  no  assured  tenure  of  party  control  so 
long  as  the  soviet  as  an  institution  continues  to  function. 

Reduced  to  its  simplest  terms  the  soviet  is  an  institution  which 
seeks  to  promote  government  of  workers,  by  workers,  and  for  workers. 
Workers  include  all  who  toil.  Work  is  declared  a universal  duty  through 
the  adoption  of  the  motto:  “He  shall  not  eat  who  does  not  work.” 
A serious  attempt  is  made  to  reduce  the  undue  premium  which  capi- 
talism has  placed  upon  brains  or  capital  in  contrast  with  brawn.  The 
soviet  state  seeks  to  relate  government,  including  all  the  major  ac- 
tivities, to  the  individual  on  the  basis  of  his  position  in  society  as  an 
economic  unit.  Politics  becomes  business  and  business  becomes 
politics.  Soviet  government  is  the  recognized  agent  for  the  direction 
and  the  development  of  cooperative  and  communistic  activity. 


FOREIGN  GOVERNMENTS  AND  POLITICS 


467 


Many  technical  criticisms  of  the  soviet  constitution  are  possible. 
Some  of  its  defects  seem  fatal:  the  diffusion  and  decentralization 
of  power  among  the  many  component  parts  of  the  state;  the  absence 
of  approximate  boundaries  between  the  central  and  local  organs  of 
government;  the  apparently  impossible  position  of  the  executive  mid 
extraordinary  responsibilities  for  the  social  welfare^  the  council  of 
people’s  commissars,  the  colleges  of  the  people’s  commissariats,  the 
ever  present  Central  Executive  Committee,  the  semi-annual  All-Rus- 
sian Congress,  and  the  ever  impending  recall ; the  emascplation  of  all 
legislative  stability  through  the  constant  power  of  recall  vested  in 
all  local  and  provincial  soviets  over  their  delegates;  and  the  calculated 
disfranchisement  of  rural  workers  in  favor  of  industrial  toilers.  In 
addition,  merely  passable  operation  under  the  soviet  constitution  would 
require  the  development  of  party  organization  and  discipline  to  a de- 
gree where  the  real  power  of  the  party  could  over-ride  the  constitu- 
tion at  will.  The  present  party  in  power  in  Russia  is  charged  with 
doing  this  very  thing. 

There  are  many  more  defects  that  might  be  mentioned,  but  it  is 
too  early  for  critical  analysis.  The  real  test  of  soviet  government 
will  be  whether  or  not  it  works.  Manifestly  its  constitution  has  not 
assumed  final  form.  The  instrument  which  has  been  promulgated  is 
more  of  a propaganda  document  than  a national  constitution.  It  is 
the  child  of  necessity,  growing  from  the  suppression  of  the  constituent 
assembly  and  the  desire  and  the  demand  for  constitutional  sanction 
of  soviet  conduct.  The  constitution  may  therefore  be  considered  as 
a more  or  less  idealized  picture  of  soviet  government  at  the  moment 
it  was  issued,  but  it  cannot  be  assumed  to  be  a true  picture  of  soviet 
government  then  or  now,  or  of  the  stabilized  soviet  constitution, 
assuming  that  the  institution  will  survive  the  revolution. 

R.  M.  Story.1 

University  of  Illinois. 

*Y.  M.  C.  A.  representative  in  Russia  and  Siberia  during  1917  and  1918. 


